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EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO PROTECT MEMBERSHIP
IN A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION::*
WIME voluntary associations can settle most of their own problems
privately, their internal affairs, like those of any organization, cannot be
completely immune to judicial supervision. A member may be substantially
injured by wrongful suspension or expulsion.1 Not only does he lose the
personal privileges of membership, but his reputation and prestige are bound
to suffer from the attendant publicity. - And where the association is a
professional society or labor union, his earning power may be seriously
impaired. Only by an equitable order of reinstatement can the complex
array of injuries to the wronged member's reputation and income be cor-
rected. 3
Yet courts are understandably reluctant to make their processes available
to every individual who may be dissatisfied with the treatment he has re-
ceived from his fellow members. Judicial intervention in an intramural
dispute may arouse resentment, disrupting the internal harmony which is
*Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
1. The test of wrongful expulsion which courts usually apply, once they have as-
sumed jurisdiction, largely concerns the procedure used by the association. E.g., Smith v.
Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942). See WVhGH=nrGTOSN, UN -
incoaopATED Assocwrioxs § S6 (2d ed. 1923) ; Comment, Protcclion of Mninbcrsip irn
Voluntary Associations, 37 YArm L. J. 36S (1928). Expulsion is usually enjoined if the as-
sociation has violated the procedural safeguards in its own by-laws. Willis v. Davis, 233
S.W. 1035 (Tex.Civ.App.1921); Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S2d 812 (Sup.Ct.1945).
Moreover, some courts read into the by-laws a provision requiring charges, notice and hear-
ing. Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79 (1941); Strong v. Minnesota Auto
Trade Ass'n, 151 Minn. 406, 186 N.W. S00 (1922). British courts take the view that
the procedure must conform to the principles of "natural justice," which affords them a
freer hand in reviewing the proceeding. Bunn v. National Amalgamated Laborers'
Union, 2 Ch. 364 (1920) ; Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners' Federation, 1 Ch. 3f 5
(1913) ; see Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 376, 259 N.Y.Supp. 443, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
Only in a few cases have the courts looked to the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., Polin
v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. S33 (1931), S0 U. op P.%. L. Rmr. 452 (1932). But
some courts have invalidated an expulsion on a finding that the association tribunal acted
in bad faith or exceeded its jurisdiction. Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370, 104
N.E. 624 (1914) ; Bartlett v. Bartlett, 116 Wis. 450, 93 N.W. 473 (l03).
2. "The expulsion of one from a club, social organization or the like, implies that he
cannot get along with his fellows, or even worse that he is unfit to be associated with.
Once the news of his expulsion is bruited about, the consequences in his personal and in
his business life can be very harmful." de Funiak, Equitable Protection of Personal or
Indidual Rights, 36 Ky. L. J. 7, 26 (1947). See Chafee, The Intcn:al Affairs of As-
sociations Not for Profit, 43 H.Rv. L. Ray. 993, 993 (1930). It has been suggested that
wrongful expulsion should be treated as a tort akin to defamation of character. Note, 7
Coi-x. L. Q. 261, 265 (1922).
3. Where the association performs a public function or possesses statutory powers
by virtue of its incorporation, the courts sometimes grant relief through the writ of
mandamus. E.g, State ex rcl. Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College, S1 Neb. 533, 116 N.
294 (1903); Barry v. The Players, 147 App.Div. 704, 132 N.Y.Supp. 59 (1st Dep't
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often the touchstone of an association's success.' Since its officers are
obviously best equipped to adjudicate controversies arising in their own
bailiwick, they should be granted a wide discretion by the courts.
In seeking to refrain from undue interference, courts of equity have
naturally restricted their jurisdiction in these cases by the application of
equitable criteria. 5 Some of these, such as the axioms that equity will act
only when the remedy at law is inadequate and when a substantial interest
is impaired, seem relatively appropriate. Many courts, however, have also
invoked the traditional equity doctrine that jurisdiction may be assumed
only for the protection of "property rights." I This test has been abandoned
1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 669, 97 N.E. 1102 (1912) (incorporated club). In the absence of
these factors, the courts generally deny mandatory relief. People ex rel. Schults v. Love,
199 App.Div. 815, 192 N.Y.Supp. 354 (1st Dep't 1922) (trade union) ; Jinkins v. Carra-
way, 187 N.C. 405, 121 S.E. 657 (1924) (lodge). Contra: Smetherham v. Laundry
Workers' Union, 44 Cal.App.2d 131, 111 P2d 948 (1941). And a negative injunction
rather than mandatory relief is the appropriate weapon where expulsion is merely
threatened, and not accomplished. See Medical Society of Mobile County v. Walker, 245
Ala. 135, 139, 16 So.2d 321, 325 (1944). Thus the unavailability of mandamus does not
preclude an action for such equitable relief. See Pirics v. First Russian Slavonic Greek
Catholic Benevolent Society, 83 N.J. Eq. 29, 34, 89 Atl. 1036, 1038 (1914) ; People cx rel.
Schults v. Love, supra, at 818, 192 N.Y.Supp., at 356.
Other criteria for granting relief may, however, be similar for the two remedies. "At
all events, the judicial attitude toward an expulsion does not appear to be affected by any
difference between mandamus and an injunction. The same tests of the wrongfulness of
the expulsion and the same discretionary reasons against relief apply to both remedies."
Chafee, sipra note 2, at 1014.
4. "The interest that holds community service organizations together is . .. the un-
selfish spirit of those willing to sacrifice their time and energy to a public cause. That
interest would not be protected but destroyed by strict judicial [intervention] in such
agencies on complaint of their members. The court would find itself a constant inter-
meddler in community affairs serving no purpose other than to disrupt the morale and
good will of voluntary organizations." United States ex rtl. Noel v. Carmody, 148 F,2d
684, 686 (D.C.Cir. 1945). See MCCLINTOcK, EQuIrY § 161 (2d ed. 1948).
5. For a summary of the various limitations on equity jurisdiction, see 1 LAW-
PENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 41-50 (1929).
6. E.g., Rogers v. Tangier Temple, 112 Neb. 166, 198 N.W. 873 (1924) (injunction
denied because expelled member had no "property right") ; Kenneck v. Pennock, 305 Pa.
288, 157 Atl. 613 (1931) (same); Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch.D. 661 (1890) (same). The
doctrine is said to have originated from a dictum in a decision which in fact protected a
personal right. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 428, 452 (1818) (enjoining malicious
publication of letters). Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamnation and Injuries to
Personality, 29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 643-4 (1916). The doctrine has come under heavy
fire from text-writers and commentators. See, e.g., POMEROY, EQuIr JURISPRUDENCE
§ 1338 (5th ed. 1941); WA.sH, EQuIrY § 52 (1930); Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to
Protect Personal Rights, 33 YAi. L. J. 115 (1923) ; Chafee, The Progress of the Lazo,
1919-1920, 34 H~Av. L. Ray. 388, 407-15 (1921); Notes, 20 NoTRE DAME LAw. 56
(1944); 20 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 304 (1948). And see Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and In-
junctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. Ray. 144, 158 (1944) : "As a description of judicial action,




in other areas where injunctions are sought,7 and its application seems to be
particularly inapposite in voluntary association cases. Since the real subject
of protection is the complainant's status as a member, the existence of a
"property right" is entirely irrelevant to the desirability of judicial interven-
tion in a particular case.8
Although this doctrine is frequently cited, few courts have allowed it
seriously to affect their determination as to the appropriateness of equitable
remedies. Sometimes, purporting to apply contract principles, they assume
jurisdiction without any mention of "property rights." 0 Other courts have
7. Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So2d 852 (1942) (alienation of affections
enjoined, the action at law having been abolished by statute); Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, 30 Cat2d 110, 180 P2d 321 (1947) (ejection from a race track enjoined); see
Note, 15 U. OF CUI.L.Rv. 227 (1947) ; Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 52S, 70 N.E.2d
241 (1946) (granting jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of handbills); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 7M0, 195 S.E. 55
(1938) (enjoining publication of picture in a newspaper advertisement); Thompson v.
Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930) (enjoining revocation of driver's license under
an inialid ordinance). In the Kenyon Case, at 533-4, 70 N.E. 2d, at 244, the court said:
"[I]f equity would safeguard their right to sell bananas it ought to be at least equally
solicitous of their personal liberties guaranteed by the Constitution."
In Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.M. 233, 237 (Tex.Civ. App. 1924) (enjoining molestation
of a woman by her thwarted lover), the court asserted: "... . the courts of this state
are not required to search for rights of property on which to base jurisdiction to grant
injunctions.. "' But the Texas courts reverted to the doctrine in subsequent cases.
See, e.g., Ex parte Castro, 115 Tex. 77, 81, 273 S.M. 795, 797 (1925) (voiding injunction
prohibiting husband's remarriage within a year in violation of a statute); Brazell v.
Gault, 160 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.Civ.App.1942) (refusing to enjoin Texas ranger from
carrying out his threat to arrest plaintiff). Similarly, scattered dicta in other jurisdic-
tions have explicitly protected "personal rights" in equity, but without precluding later
courts in the same jurisdiction from reviving the dogma on occasion.
8. "[E]xpulsion from social or fraternal or trade organizations may go far toward
wrecking the complainant's prospects in life. Can there be any doubt in such cases that
his very slender interest in the assets of the organization, in which he would probably
never realize anything in some future indefinite winding-up of its affairs, is a mere ex-
cuse, satisfying the supposed rule that a property interest must be involved, protection
of the personal rights of the member being the real purpose of the courts?" WALsir,
EQurr-, 275-6 n.37 (1930). See also Pound, supra note 6, at 677-Si; Comment, 37
YALE L. J. 368 (1928) ; Note, 7 CoR. L. Q. 261 (1922).
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Interpational Alliance, 60 Cal. App2d 713, 716, 141 P2d 406,
488 (1943); Yockel v. German-American Bund, 20 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (1940). But the
courts do not, in fact, apply strict contract principles, nor would this be desirable. They
often look beyond the by-laws which comprise the supposed contract. There is seldom
any attempt to look into the merits of the controversy, as would be required under a
contract theory. Dean Pound has criticized the application of contract principles on the
ground that the courts would be called upon to grant relief for minor infractions of the
by-laws, thus overloading court dockets. Pound, stpra note 6, at 6S0--1.
Although many of the courts which speak in terms of contract seem to have aban-
doned the property requirement, perhaps on the theory that any contract involves a
"property right," there is no necessary doctrinal reason for so doing. If the courts are
to insist on a "property right" in plaintiff before granting equitable jurisdiction, the
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declared that membership in any voluntary association is in itself a "prop-
erty right," thereby rendering the doctrine meaningless as a criterion of
jurisdiction."0 At other times, the "property right" relied upon is of so
nominal a nature " or is so clearly capable of protection in an action at law 1z
as to indicate that the court is merely paying lip service to the principle.
But in the recent case of Berrien v. Pollitzer,'3 the "property right" criter-
ion as applied to expulsion from voluntary associations was, for the first
time, explicitly repudiated. The suit involved a dispute within the National
Woman's Party, a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized for the pur-
pose of securing equality for women. Certain of the defendants, purporting
to act as the National Council of the Party, adopted a resolution temporarily
excluding from the Party headquarters all members of an "insurgent"
group. One of the "insurgents," who had received no notice of the proposed
resolution or of the meeting at which it was adopted, sued to enjoin this
action. The federal district court, however, refused to assume jurisdiction
on the ground that a court of equity "can interfere only to protect property
rights." 14
On appeal, counsel for plaintiff assumed the necessity of a "property
right" and based his argument on its presence. 1 But the court of appeals,
while it reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the merits, refused
existence of a "contract" need not obviate the requirement. Thus some courts, viewing
the relationship as contractual, have also looked for a "property right" before granting
jurisdiction. E.g., Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897) ; Medical Society
of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944).
10. See Hardt v. McLaughlin, 25 F.Supp. 684, 685 (E.D.Pa.1936) ("[M]embershlp
in any club involves certain basic payments ... which,- at the least, gives rights of
ownership in the club property . . ."); Jones v. Rhea, 130 Va. 345, 358, 107 S.E. 814,
818 (1921) ("Membership in a social club entitles the member to certain social oppor-
tunities and enjoyments, and affords him an interest, though not a transmissible interest,
in the club property."). But cf. Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 465 (1939).
The more general view of courts denying jurisdiction is that the "property right" must
be severable. Since a member's interest in an unincorporated association cannot be
transferred and is not subject to execution, it does not meet this requirement. State ex
rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Medical Society, 295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341 (1922);
Franklin v. Burnham, 82 N.Y. Supp. 882 (Sup.Ct.1903) (Masonic fraternity); Rogers
v. Tangier Temple, 112 Neb. 166, 198 N.W. 873 (1924) (fraternal society).
11. E.g., Holcombe v. Leavitt, 124 N.Y.Supp. 980 (Sup.Ct.1910) (possibility of be.
coming a future trustee of the church-the expectancy of legal title evidently constitut-
ing the property right). The English courts require only that the club own some prop-
erty. Compare Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890) (no property; injunction denied),
with D'Arcy v. Adamson, 29 T.L.R. 367 (1913) (property owned; injunction granted).
12. Froelich v. Musicians' Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 93 Mo.App. 383 (1902) (funeral
benefits) ; Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918) (insurance policies);
Heasley v. Operative Plasterers' and Cement Finishers' International Ass'n, 324 Pa. 257,
188 Atl. 206 (1936) (death and disability benefits).
13. 165 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir.1947).
"14. Civil Action No. 530-47, U.S.D.D.C.(1947).
15. Brief for Appellant, pp. 12-8, Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir.1947).
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so to ground its decision. All three judges held that "personal rights" of the
plaintiff had been infringed, and that jurisdiction was warranted regardless
of whether she had an interest in the assets of the association. Declaring
that equity should protect "personal rights" by injunction just as readily
as it protects "property rights," "1 the court based its decision on the in-
adequacy of the legal remedy. Since invasions of "personal" interests are
"less capable of translation into money terms than invasions of property
interests," the need for equitable relief was deemed even greater in the former
class of cases.'7
Abandonment of the "property right" requirement would leave other
criteria apparently adequate for determining equitable jurisdiction. The
first of these, absence of an adequate remedy at law, is easily met by an
aggrieved member. As was pointed out in the Pollitzer case, rarely can he
obtain real redress in an action at law. While only a few courts have refused
to allow a suit for damages,"3 it is difficult for a jury to measure the amount
to be awarded. 19 And the paucity of suits for damages, even in jurisdictions
insisting that a substantial "property right" be prerequisite to an injunc-
tion, indicates that expelled members are generally more interested in re-
gaining their status than their property interest.
A further requirement for jurisdiction, peculiar to this class of equity
cases, is exhaustion of the plaintiff's remedies within the association.'- This
16. Cited for this proposition was Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 533, 534, 70
N.E2d 241, 244 (1946), where the court stated: "Ve believe the true rule to be that
equity will protect personal rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon which it
will protect property rights by injunction." And see cases cited in note 7 supra.
17. This statement appears to go beyond the requirements of the holding. If followed,
it would reverse the previous requirements for equitable jurisdiction, in that a member
alleging an injury of a primarily personal nature would be in a better position than one
whose loss was chiefly monetary.
18. Peyre v. Society of French Zouaves, 90 CaL 240, 27 Pac. 191 (1891) ; Lavalle v.
Soci&6t St. Jean Baptiste, 17 R.I. 60, 24 At. 467 (1892); Kelly v. National Society of
Printers' Ass'ts, 84 L.J.K.B. 2236 (1915). But most of the cases are con Ira. Punitive
damages and damages for mental suffering have sometimes been awarded. St. Louis S.W.
Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144 (190S). But cf. Boutvell v. Marr, 71
Vt 1, 42 Atl. 607 (1899). See Expulsion of Member of Club, 70 SOL. J. 823 (1926).
But apparently the requirements for a damage suit are more stringent than for equitable
relief. Thus in one recent case, an injunction wras granted, but damages were denied.
The court said that damages will be awarded only where there is "proof of fraud or bad
faith on the part of the membership as a whole, as distinguished from the officers order-
ing the expulsion .. ." Coleman v. O'Leary, 53 N.Y.S2d 811, 817 (Sup.Ct.1945);
accord: Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 467, 49 X.E2d 713, 717 (1943). It has beca
argued that the absence of a "legal right" should not preclude equitable relief. See
Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? 75 U.oFPA.L.R,. 1, 25-6 (1926).
19. See Lavalle v. Sochi~t St. Jean Baptiste, 17 RI. 620, 687, 24 At. 467, 469 (1892).
20. E.g., Fish v. Huddell, 51 F2d 319 (D.C.Cir.1931); Simpson v. Salvation Army,
49 Cal.App.2d 371, 121 P.2d 847 (1942). As to labor union cases, see Note, 16S A.L.R.
1462, 1463 (1947). The rule is generally applied even where the plaintiff has a "property
right" Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 NJ.Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (1945). But cf.
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rule, however, has been riddled with exceptions. Where the constitution and
by-laws are so patently unjust as to deny the possibility of a fair trial, courts
often take the position that further proceedings within the association
would be a fruitless formality. 21 And sometimes the requirement has been
obviated where the plaintiff was expelled "without jurisdiction" or in an
irregular proceeding.
22
More difficult for an aggrieved member to satisfy is the requirement that
the injury be of a substantial character before courts will take cognizance
of it at all. The relative importance of membership to a particular in-
dividual, as measured by such facts as officership and length of membership,
would seem to have an important bearing on this issue. In practice, however,
courts seem to have considered only the type of organization, determining
the substantiality of the injury primarily on the basis of this factor.
In applying this criterion, it is inevitable that courts weigh the extent of
the member's injury against the disadvantages of intervening in the par-
ticular type of association. Expulsion from a church is usually deemed of
sufficient consequence to warrant judicial intervention,24 despite the reluc-
Smith v. International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union, 190 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.
Civ.App.1945), rev'd on other grounds, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946). In suits
for damages, on the other hand, some courts have allowed appeal to the courts in the
first instance. Sons and Daughters v. Wilkes, 98 Miss. 179, 53 So. 493 (1910). Contra:
McGuinness v. Foresters of America, 78 Conn. 43, 60 AtI. 1023 (1905).
21. E.g., Willis v. Davis, 233 S.W. 1035 (Tex.Civ.App.1921) (no possibility of fair
hearing because those who brought the charges were to judge plaintiff's case). And see
Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo.App. 461, 483, 136 S.W.2d 374, 387 (1940): "[W]hero fraud,
oppression, or bad faith is shown; or where it appears that an appeal within the organ-
ization would have been a vain and useless step, then the failure of the member to have
availed himself of the remedies within the organization will not be a bar to his right to
ask judicial interference"; Blek v. Wilson, 145 Misc.. 373, 376, 259 N. Y. Supp. 443, 446
(Sup. Ct. 1932) : "[I]f the constitution of the organization itself is so unfair, unreason-
able and arbitrary as to deprive him of a fair trial, he may then appeal to this court .. "
22. Medical Society of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944)
(procedure "irregular and without jurisdiction") ; Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 120
P.2d 79 (1941) (member "denied the due process of notice and a hearing") ; Gardner v.
East Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. 198, 113 Atl. 308 (1921) (beyond jurisdiction of lodge);
Chew v. Manhattan Laundries, 134 N.J.Eq. 566, '36 A.2d 205 (1944) (members denied
opportunity to learn of right of appeal within organization). The consequence of some
of these cases is, in effect, to eliminate the rule requiring exhaustion of remedies, The
tests for immediate resort to the courts do not seem to vary appreciably from those
applied to determine the wrongfulness of the expulsion. See note 1 sispra.
23. Professor Chafee has categorized the various policies which may determine ju-
dicial interference with the different types of associations under four headings: (1) The
Strangle-hold Policy (courts should be more prone to interfere where injury is of a
serious nature), (2) The Dismal Swamp Policy (should be reluctant to assume the risk
of interpreting the occult rules of churches and lodges), (3) The Hot Potato Policy
(should consider the amount of resentment that will be aroused), (4) The Living Tree
Policy (should weigh the value of the* association's autonomy). See Chafee, supra note
2, at 1020-9.
24. Taylor v. Jackson, 273 Fed. 345 (D.C.Cir.1921); cf. Mathis v. Holmes, 134
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tance of courts to become arbiters of theological matters.2 Expulsion from a
labor union or business organization generally carries with it such obvious
economic injury that the cases granting jurisdiction are legion. ' But courts
have been less generous in granting jurisdiction where the association is a
professional society,2 even though the nature and extent of the injury caused
by expulsion here seem equally great. They have been even more reluctant
to reinstate expelled students to schools and colleges, 3 apparently feeling
N.J.Eq. 186, 34 A.2d 645 (1943) (enjoining the closing of a church by the trustees);
Mattson v. Saastamoinen, 168 Mii. 178, 209 N.W. 64S (1926) (assuming jurisdiction in
suit to enjoin change of religious doctrines). Contra: United States ex rel Johnson v.
First Colored Baptist Church, 13 F.2d 296 (D.C.Cir.1926); Deloisted v. Hilson, 120
Neb. 788, 235 N.W. 340 (1931); but cf. Gibson v. Singleton, 149 Ga. 501, 101 S.E. 173
(1919) (refusing to enjoin election even though it would "result in an illegal and fraudu-
lent election, and be violative of the rules of the church, and permit the pastor to enforce
his own arbitrary will upon the church for his own private and personal purposes.").
See Notes, 71 U.oFPA.L.REv. 161 (1923); 13 VA.L.REv. 400 (1927).
25. The language of the court in Holcombe v. Leavitt, 124 N.Y.Supp. 98, 931
(Sup. Ct. 1910), is typical: "The court recognizes that all questions of faith, doctrine,
and discipline belong exclusively to the church and its spiritual officers, and that the
question of church membership is purely ecclesiastical." Whereupon the court proceedqd
to enjoin the expulsion of the complaining members. In Bonacum v. Harrington, 65 Neb.
831, 834, 91 N.W. 886, 837 (1902), the court, per Pound, C, said: "The laws and de-
crees of the church in evidence presuppose a considerable knowledge of the canon law,
and their interpretation by a court, which has no knowledge and cannot take judicial
notice of that system, must necessarily be very unsatisfactory..
26. Loss of employment is almost always considered sufficiently severe to warrant
equitable intervention. E.g., Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers v.
Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So2d 705 (1944); see cases cited in Note, 16S A.LR. 1462,
1479-42 (1947). Other incidents of union membership which the courts have considered
in granting jurisdiction include: benefits of collective bargaining, Obergfell v. Green,
29 F.Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 121 F.2d 46 (D.C.Cir. 1941);
seniority rights, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miller, 219 Ind. 389, 38 N.E2d 239 (1941).
But the court must weigh the substantiality of these injuries against the possible harm
resulting from judicial intervention. See A cxA Cr.m Lumm'irs Uaow., DFnxcnc"
xx Ta.knn Umoxs 35-40 (1939); Thatcher, Shall We Have More Rcgulation of the In-
terwxl Affairs of Labor Unions? 7 LAw. GuILD Rnv. 14 (1947); Comment, 45 Ym.n L.J.
1248 (1936).
27. State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Medical Society, 295 Mo. 144, 243 SM.
341 (1922) (denying mandamus to reinstate) ; WVeyreus v. Scotts Bluff County Medical
Society, 133 Neb. 814, 277 NAV. 378 (1938), 17 NE. L. Buu. 229 (1939) (refusing to
enjoin expulsion) ; cf. Howard v. Betts, 190 Ga. 530, 9 S.E2d 742 (1940) (refusing to
enjoin withdrawal of local charter of dental society). But cf. Medical Society of Mobile
County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 140, 16 So2d 321, 325 (1944).
28. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App.Div. 487, 231 N.Y.Supp. 435 (4th Dep't
1928) (refusing to enjoin ex\pulsion without cause) ; Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278
Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220 (1923) (denying mandamus to reinstate student dismissed without
a hearing). Most private educational institutions reserve the right to dismiss students
without cause, and the courts have generally been unwilling to impose procedural stand-
ards. Since public schools are governed largely by statute, mandamus has issued in a
great number of instances. E.g., School Board v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1,103 Pac. 578 (1909)
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that educational institutions must be granted a broad discretion in matters
of discipline if they are to operate effectively. In lodge cases the financial
loss is so minimal and the extent of the personal injury so difficult to deter-
mine that courts have tended to maintain a hands-off attitude."
Where internal remedies are inadequate or have been exhausted, it seems
sensible to determine equitable jurisdiction by thus balancing the substan-
tiality of each injury against the disadvantages of intervening in the volun-
tary association involved. Certainly, the "property right" test, frequently
evaded in the past and repudiated in Berrien v. Pollitzer, has no place in a
field where personal relationships are paramount.
(granting mandamus to reinstate expelled student to public school). See Pennypacker,
Mandamus to Restore Academic Privileges, 12 VA. L. Rm. 645 (1926).
29. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586 (Ct. C.P. 1892) ; Plemenik v. Prickett, 97 N.J.Eq.
340, 127 Atl. 342 (1925) ; cf. Micklish v. Grand Lodge, 162 Ark. 71, 257 S.W. 353 (1924).
But cf. Denison v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 191 Iowa 698, 182 N.W, 873
(1921). The difficulty of understanding the ritual 6f the lodge has sometimes been a
deterrent to the assumption of jurisdiction. E.g., Wellenvoss v. Grand Lodge, 103 Ky.
415, 45 S.W. 360 (1898).
